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# What went wrong? And what do we do now?

*These prescriptions for new directions in American policy are part of a series being assembled by the Ethics and Public Policy Center.*

## Drop failed advisers

By Paul Seabury

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If America's reputation as a credible power is to be recaptured, our foreign-policy establishment must be taken apart and put together again. Personnel changes must be more than cosmetic. They should be instituted now by President Carter, not by whomever manages to be elected next November.

When Carter first came to Washington in 1977, attention focused chiefly on his Georgia clansmen — the Lance-Jordan group of unknown Jacksonian parochials. Far less noticed at the time was his swiftly recruited phalanx of foreign-policy placemen, largely recruited by Anthony Lake.

This group was wise to Washington ways. Except for Andy Young, President Carter's torchbearer, they all had some claim to knowledge and experience in foreign-policy matters. But as someone said of them, they were and are McGovernites without McGovern.

Their humane objectives soon were translated into policy: No covert manipulation of or in other nations; U.S. troop withdrawals from South Korea; avid pursuit of human rights in countries that were our friends, and in some (not Cuba or China or Vietnam, however) that were not our friends; stern warnings to old, imperfect allies to shape up or risk abandonment; humane overtures to enemies about normalization of relations, in the interests of peace, regardless of the character of their internal regimes; abandonment of Taiwan; and so on.

Virtue was shown in various League of Women Voters themes such as arms control, arms sales, nuclear proliferation and covert operations. As though to confirm the fact that now America was more dedicated to global perspectives than to the making known of national purposes, the U.S. Information Agency became the International Communications Agency. A virtuous foreign policy — even in dealing with Russians — would persuade others to go and do likewise.

The ruins of this policy now lie around us. The architects of this experiment\* drawn from the Vietnam-Watergate generation and alert to the abuses of American national power (and of the power of less-than-perfect allies), presided over the decline of American foreign policy.

The president must reach down into his own administration — the State Department, the Defense Department and the National Security Council — to establish new men free from shibboleths of Vietnam and Watergate.

The criterion should be a capacity to think and act strategically, not spasmodically or reactively. The new leadership should have no illusions about the dangerous nature of world politics. The pieces of the world must be regarded as parts of a large mosaic global strategy and dealt with in ways that will convince others of America's determination to restore strength in concert with allies who will again trust us.

This is no vendetta. There are many valuable people in the Carter administration. But Leopold Amery's words to Neville Chamberlain in May 1940 must be leveled at the McGovernites: "You have sat too long for any good you have been doing."

In this election year, a changing of the guard might even be good politics for the president. The American public, which votes, needs as much reassurance about the president's intentions as do our allies and adversaries. Such changes in key posts, however, could signal to an apprehensive world that, whoever the next president is, there will be a formidable continuity of resolve after November.

## Rebuild defenses

By Adda Bozeman

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The immediate need for the United States is a buildup of our conventional and strategic military forces and weapons systems to defend ourselves and our allies in the critical period of the early 1980s.

We must redress the present unfavorable balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; make possible the early deployment of reliable naval task forces in all geopolitically vital waters as well as the eventual development of an effective tri-ocean strategy; and deter the Soviet Union and its surrogates in Europe, Africa and Asia from furthering their expansionist designs upon independent states. This means radical modification of the Carter administration's inadequate defense program.

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